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NSK-W

20 September 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe  
Attn: COS

Chief, Foreign Division S

Chief, Foreign Division N

NSA/Operational

Recruitment of Germanian Singletons

Attached are the undersigned's comments on the recruitment of  
Germanian singletons.

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Dist:

- 1 - COS
- 1 - SR
- 2 - COS
- 1 - Reg.
- 1 - SAC/ATLANTA
- 2 - WFO
- 1 - FHM

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20 September 1951

Subject: The Recruitment of Ukrainian Stagelaters

1. For the past two years the possibility of recruiting Ukrainian stagelaters with negligible espionage group connections has been frequently discussed but to our knowledge little action has been taken. For this reason it is still a matter of conjecture whether an adequate number of Ukrainian stagelaters can be recruited in Germany or for that matter any place else. Our last Ukrainian stagelater was the Ukrainian CASAT who was recruited by CASAT, an agent spotter in the Intelligence DP Camp. He must arrive at a definite number as to whether or not stage agents can be recruited in Western Europe by CSOB. If it is impossible to recruit agents outside of espionage groups in Germany, the recruitment of several stagelaters can only be handled as a secondary or peripheral assignment, then headquarters should be informed accordingly. We are at present better oriented on the Ukrainian end-problem in Germany than in any other part of the world where stagelaters originate. For that reason if for no other, Germany is the logical place for the initial concerted attempt at recruitment. It is requested that CSOB concert the efforts of one or more case officers on this recruitment assignment and report not later than 1 November by month on the results achieved. How is the proper use of year for recruiting bodies for dispatch in Spring 1952.

2. Here are a few informal suggestions on possible lines of approach:

a. Many Ukrainian DP's have been refused admission on out of Germany because of unfavorable past political or military commitments. For many of these people the outlook for the future is fairly bleak. There must be some position in this category who would be willing to undertake a hazardous assignment in exchange for the possibility of emigrating out of Western Europe.

b. Although we would prefer not to recruit or use the members of various espionage political groups, some variety of out-ent or agent spotter must be used because we have no case officers with undercover access to persons of this type we want to recruit. So long as we have no case officers who can handle the problem of recruitment overtly and in person, we must use a out-ent or intermediary to do our recruiting.

c. In the CASAT case, CASAT was not only talent agent but he helped along the emigration caused by the contacts and goings of CASAT (also SPANISH and other persons he provided to us) in the underground goldfish bowl. In brief the agent spotter must also serve as a consolidator of the agent's covering, a security watchdog and barometer, and to some extent a father-confessor. The spotter has to be trusted before he can do his job properly.

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d. It goes without saying that any aggregation of Ukrainians such as the Guard Companies or ENVELOPE trainees are easily accessible recruitment pools. Approach to these pools by American case officers is not so complicated a security problem as an agent spotter at a DP camp would be.

e. There are of course in Germany many non-political groupings of Ukrainian men and women, for instance there are professional, social and charitable organizations which have not become completely side-tracked into the political arena. Perhaps the recruitment of singletons could be accomplished by a spotter in such a group. It follows that so long as we believe that it is to our interest to support only the resistance organization under CASPORE 1 we do not want to get involved with any group rivaling CASPORE 1 and proposing to start another underground in the Eastern Ukraine which will waste a lot of effort in trying to outshine CASPORE. In other words we do not want a singleton who is primarily or even secondarily interested in creating prestige in the Ukraine for an entire group.

f. If you deem it expedient CAPELIN may be utilized as an agent spotter. CASPER's connection with ENVELOPE described in MEMO 4116 may also fit him for such a job. As far as the undersigned knows, these are the only two people whom we could use as agent spotters without waiting for additional operational clearance from headquarters. It is obvious that we need more CASPERs and CAPELINS.

### 3. Miscellaneous comments:

a. To the best of our knowledge the only REDSOX operation involving a female singleton was mounted by [redacted]. What are the reasons against parachuting a healthy, brown, young, Eastern Ukrainian peasant girl (or for that matter two) into her (their) homeland. The RIS has probably gathered by now that the AIS is too shy to recruit female agents. Armed with this knowledge the RIS is able to save a lot of investigational time and trouble. The same comments apply to so-called family groups.

b. The Eastern Ukraine has more primary intelligence targets than the Western Ukraine. However there are far fewer Eastern Ukrainian emigres from which we can recruit. Probably in our present ignorance of local conditions in the Eastern Ukraine we are not in a position to give adequate briefing and training to an agent who has not been in the Eastern Ukraine since the end of the war. The same limitations apply to documentation as well. Tourist mission singletons and other types who must exfiltrate themselves unaided in order to be of any value do not answer our problem. A great deal of time and effort goes into the training and dispatch of a singleton and if we are truthful with ourselves, we must admit that the odds against a singleton's being able to exfiltrate himself without help are not very high. It is therefore suggested that an effort be made to convince as many singletons as possible that they should remain in the

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Soviet Union until such a time as their chances for successful exfiltration have been improved. If a singleton has contact with us via U/T there is at least a slight possibility that we could help him get out of the Soviet Union or otherwise help him to survive. Please therefore give full consideration to U/T training and equipment for singleton agents.

c. The advisability of training two or more singleton agents together should be carefully studied. The unfavorable security factors inherent in such an arrangement are sometimes outweighed by the drag on agent morale, training personnel and safe house facilities which the normal training or debriefing of an isolated individual has been known to involve.

d. Since blood-brother friendships are common among Slavs and two men can be expected to accomplish a more complicated mission than one man alone, it is suggested that full consideration be given to the recruitment and dispatch not only of singletons and teams but also of pairs and even "family groups."

4. A study of the recruitment possibilities in North and South America has already begun at headquarters. No recruiting will however be done until CSOS's experience in Germany is known to headquarters. It is much more difficult to determine the best methods for recruiting singletons in the United States and Canada, for very little is known in comparison to Germany about the behavior, availability and motivation of Ukrainian DP's who have so recently started new lives in this hemisphere.

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